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Abstract 
We examine how individuals’ retirement expectations adjust in the wake of significant reforms 
introduced in the 2011 and 2014 Pension Act to the State Pension Age (SPA) in the UK. Our 
empirical results suggest a widening of the gap between SPA and the expected retirement age 
(ERA): men and women do not significantly adjust their expectations upward in response to 
an increase in SPA, as would be consistent with the policy objective. While ERA varies by 
socioeconomic group, we do not find that particular at-risk groups such as the low educated or 
unskilled adjusted their ERA differently than other groups. Our findings may suggest that 
workers are not adjusting their retirement planning for the increased UK State Pension Age 
and could be insufficiently preparing for retirement.  
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1. Introduction  
The 2018 Industrial Strategy published by the UK government stated the ageing society as one 
of the country’s Grand Challenges. The fiscal implications of an ageing population have a 
significant impact on current and future government expenditures such as health care services 
and state pensions. Since the 1990s the retirement decision, often defined as a gradual reduction 
or complete cessation of labour supply (Denton & Spencer, 2009), has gradually come to the 
forefront of the policy agenda with the aim of curbing the long-term trend of earlier labour 
market exits among older workers and thereby increasing income tax revenues (Blundell, 
Meghir & Smith, 2002; Banks, Emmerson & Tetlow, 2018). The situation is not unique to the 
UK; governments in many OECD countries have introduced reforms to reduce the burden on 
the state of an ageing population. Increasing the State Pension Age (SPA) reduces State Pension 
expenditures1 and has the potential to influence retirement, or more generally labour market 
participation and/or work intensity at older ages, due to its implications for individuals’ 
consumption as State Pension is an important source of income (DWP, 2018) and the strong 
social norms associated with reaching SPA (Kohli, 1991; Amin-Smith & Crawford, 2018).2 
Understanding future labour supply intentions related to retirement and how such intentions 
respond to SPA reforms is therefore of significant policy relevance.  
In this paper, we examine the effect of raising the age at which individuals become eligible to 
claim their state pension, that is the State Pension Age (SPA), on their future expected 
retirement age (ERA). Alongside other OECD countries, the UK government began reforming 
                                                            
1 For instance, keeping the SPA fixed at 66 in the UK as opposed to increasing it as legislated to 68 by 2045/46 
has been estimated to cost £250 billion (DWP, 2017a) 
2 Unretirement in the UK is relatively uncommon among the already retired though higher rates have been 
estimated for initially employed individuals (Kanabar, 2016; Platts et al., 2017).  
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SPA from the mid- 1990s onwards; in 1995 legislation enacted sought to equate women’s SPA 
(historically 60) to that of men (65). Subsequent reforms increased the pace of equalisation and 
also raised the SPA of both men and women to 66 or 67, depending on their date of birth. Due 
to the timing of the reforms and the cohorts affected (with the exception of certain older 
women) very little is known about how men and women have or intend to react in terms of 
their labour supply behaviour in response to higher SPA in the UK.3 A key question addressed 
in this paper, therefore, is how do individuals intend to respond to such policy changes? Only 
then is it possible to understand whether individuals have adjusted their labour supply 
intentions in a manner which is consistent with the policy objective. We analyse how the 2011 
and 2014 State Pension Acts in the UK affected men’s and women’s Expected Retirement Age 
(ERA) using the United Kingdom Household Panel Study.  
We analyse how individuals intend to change their age of retirement in response to increases 
in SPA by making use of expectation data. Expectations data has been shown to play an 
important role in explaining major lifecycle decisions such as the decision to retire (Manksi, 
2004; Chan & Stevens, 2004; Benitez-Silva & Dwyer, 2005; Botazzi, Japelli & Padula, 2006; 
Cobb-Clark & Stillman, 2006). Disney and Tanner (1999), using the UK Retirement History 
Survey, compare expected versus actual retirement ages and find that most individuals reported 
their expected retirement age (ERA) to be the SPA at the time. Moreover, these individuals 
subsequently retired at that age, highlighting (i) the accuracy of expectations data in predicting 
subsequent labour supply decisions and (ii) the strong cultural norms associated with reaching 
SPA or, put another way, the notion of what individuals perceive ‘retirement’ to mean in the 
                                                            
3 Cribb, Emmerson and Tetlow (2016) found that about 1 in 10 of women (aged  60 to 62) who had been affected 
by the SPA reform adjusted their labour supply.  
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UK (Kohli, 1991).4 Related to social norms is the 2011 Employment Equality Regulations 
(EER) reform which made it illegal for employers to retire employees unless there was a 
justifiable legal basis for doing so. Furthermore, the age at which individuals elicit their 
retirement expectations has been shown to be important; for example, the arrival of information 
close to retirement can lead to revisions in expected retirement age consistent with economic 
theory (Bernheim, 1989).5 
Given the importance of retirement expectations in determining future labour supply behaviour 
on the one hand, and the strong connection between reaching SPA and ceasing or reducing paid 
work on the other; surprisingly few studies have analysed how changes in SPA affect 
retirement expectations. Notable exceptions include Botazzi, Jeppelli and Pudula (2006), De 
Grip, Fouarge and Montizaan (2013), Copolla and Wilke (2014) and Hess (2018). Botazzi, 
Jeppelli and Pudula (2006) have shown that a series of reforms introduced in Italy during the 
1990s to raise the SPA by five years increased men’s ERA by two years and by three years for 
women (see also Mastrogiacomo, 2004). The magnitude of the reforms is also likely to affect the 
extent individuals will adjust their ERA. De Grip, Fouarge and Montizaan (2013) have shown 
that those affected by the increased SPA from 65 to 66 in the Netherlands adjusted their ERA 
by 3.6 months while those who faced an increase in SPA from 65 to 67 adjusted their ERA by 
10.8 months. Whilst the reform affected both men and women in the same way their findings 
also show that the changes in ERA were driven by highly educated females who also have 
higher pension wealth. It was not clear why similarly educated men and less educated 
                                                            
4 Consistent with the findings of Bernheim (1988), they find as well that individuals report their most likely 
retirement age as opposed to their mean (expected) retirement age. Note that the so-called earning test was 
abolished in 1989; though employers could legally require individual’s to retire at 65 up until 2011.  
5 A related issue not addressed in this paper is that expectations may change with increasing age (Benitez-Silver 
and Dwyer 2004; Cobb-Clark and Stillman 2006). 
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individuals did not adjusting their expectations in the manner expected. The extent to which 
individuals adjust their ERA is also related their work capacity for example due the nature of 
their main career job (manual versus professional). Related to this, the authors suggest the 
reform had an income effect and individuals who had made a higher number of pension 
contributions were less responsive to the policy change. For Germany, in contrast, Coppola 
and Wilke (2014) findings suggest that lower educated individuals failed to adjust their 
expectations in a manner consistent with the policy objective of a SPA reform introduced in 
2007 that is similar to the one in the Netherlands. Hess (2018) analyses trends in ERA over a 
longer period than Coppola and Wilke (2014), though does not use a causal framework, and 
notes increases in ERA (particularly among the low skilled), and more generally convergence 
in ERA, across all educational groups.   
There exists little empirical evidence on the role of SPA in retirement expectations for the UK. 
The one exception we are aware of is Disney and Tanner (1999) whose data cover the late 
1980’s/early 1990s and is prior to any kind of reform to SPA. We address this gap in knowledge 
using a rich large scale nationally representative survey, the United Kingdom Household Panel 
Study (UKHLS). We exploit the fact during our sample period (2010-2016) three different 
State Pension Acts were in operation, allowing us to determine how differences in SPA impact 
ERA. 
Our main findings show that both men and women do not significantly adjust their ERA in 
response to changes to SPA. In our analysis we control for a rich set of individual and 
household level characteristics and find occupational pension, income, education, job 
occupation and sector of work are important determinants of ERA. Similar to previous studies, 
we also investigate whether particular at-risk groups such as the unskilled or low educated do 
not adjust, or adjust less, given legislated changes to SPA. Our results based on interactions 
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between SPA with our rich set of controls suggest that, irrespective of gender, such groups are 
not less likely to adjust their expectations than their higher educated or higher skilled 
counterparts; however, we do find that women living in households who report higher levels 
of income are less likely to adjust their ERA.  
Our findings are of policy relevance and suggest that by and large individuals do not, on 
average, adjust their ERA in a manner consistent with the policy objective. If the intention of 
policymakers is to keep individuals in employment for longer or, put another way, to have them 
delay retirement, then the government needs to design strategies to improve communication of 
changes in SPA. One example could be more effective information campaigns.6 Of course, it 
might be that individuals are fully aware of the increase in SPA and stick to their original 
retirement plans. Nevertheless, the retirement decision has a wide range of welfare implications 
for both the individual in terms of consumption, savings and living standards at older ages; and 
for the state from a taxation and welfare spending perspective (Manski, 2004; Cribb et al., 
2016). Therefore, understanding how SPA and different economic and sociodemographic 
characteristics affect retirement expectations is crucial if policymakers wish to ensure that 
individual’s adequately plan for retirement.  
The rest of the is paper is set out as follows. Section 2 summarises the main features of the UK 
pension system. Section 3 describes the United Kingdom Household Panel Survey. Section 4 
describes the methodology used and Section 5 presents estimation results. Section 6 discusses 
the implications of our findings and concludes.  
                                                            
6 This implies that the notion of retirement in the UK is associated with a reduction in hours worked or complete 
exit from the labour market. Whilst the ‘default retirement age’ was scrapped in the UK in 2012; there remains a 
strong association between reporting being ‘retired’ and number of hours worked or exit from the labour market 
(Banks and Smith, 2006).  
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2. Overview of Pension Policy in the UK 
The UK pension system consists of three pillars. The first is the (Basic) State Pension. The new 
Basic State Pension was introduced in April 2016 and is a single tier flat rate pension based on 
a Pay as You Go funding structure. Individuals who reached SPA prior to this date remain 
under the ‘old’ system which has two tiers: a flat rate basic pension and an additional pension 
related to earnings.7 Our sample is composed of older individuals for whom the rules of the 
pre-2016 system determine their level of state pension whilst for younger individuals the new 
system applies. Individuals in the UK are eligible to claim their State Pension (SP) when they 
reach the eligibility age (SPA) and not before. The level of SP benefit depends on the number 
of years of National Insurance Contributions made when in employment and an individual’s 
date of birth.8 In the 2018/19 tax year, the maximum SP benefit an individual can receive under 
the new single tier system is £164.35 per week.9  
Expenditure on state pensions represents a significant proportion of welfare expenditures: in 
the tax year 2017/18 this was forecasted to be £93.8 billion or just under 5% of GDP in Great-
Britain (OBR, 2018). In terms of its generosity, however, the UK has the least generous public 
state pension among OECD countries (OECD, 2017). Whilst most individuals make additional 
voluntary retirement saving through occupational and private pensions (the second and third 
pillars respectively) which determines the majority of their pension, for the poorest pensioners 
                                                            
7 See Bozio et al. (2010) for a comprehensive description of system in place prior to April 2016. 
8 A recent OECD report showed that gaps in employment have limited impact on retirement income in terms of 
state pension accrual due to welfare policies in operation in the UK (OECD, 2015).  
9 In 2018-2019 the full basic state pension amounted to £125.95 per week under the old system, however the 
amount calculated is a function of numerous factors such as the `class’ of the contribution and whether an 
individual was ‘contracted out’ (Bozio et al., 2010).  
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almost 80% of their income is state pension (Age UK, 2018). The DWP (2017) recently 
estimated that about 1.1 million single pensioners rely on their State Pension alone as their sole 
source of income (Independent, 2017). As the second and third pillars are not at the focus of 
this paper, further details can be found in Appendix A.  
2.1 State Pension and Pension Acts in the UK 
The basic structure and features of the UK State Pension system were introduced in the 
Beveridge Report published in 1948. Between 1948 and 5th April 2010 the SPA for women 
(men) remain fixed at 60 (65); however various other changes were enacted such as the 
abolishment of high marginal tax rates on employment earnings post SPA (see Bozio et al. 
(2010) for further details). The first change to SPA was made in the 1995 Pension Act, which 
legislated to equate the female SPA to that of males, specifically female SPA would be 
increased by one month every month for those individuals born after 6th April 1950, starting 
from April 2010. The full effect of the reform when originally legislated would not be complete 
until March 2020. 
The introduction of the 2007 Pension Act raised the SPA for both men and women to 66 
between 2024 and 2026 (increasing by one month, every month), to 67 between 2034 and 2036 
and to 68 between 2044 and 2046. The rationale for the reform was related to the increases in 
life expectancy observed since the 1950s (ONS, 2015), which had not been matched by an 
equivalent or proportional increase in SPA. Increasing longevity  puts significant pressures on 
government finances and has called  into question the sustainability of the UK state pension 
system (Lassila and Valkonen, 2017).  
The objective of the 2011 Pension Act was to bring forward the rise in the female SPA. The 
equalisation would now be achieved by November 2018. Moreover, the increase in the SPA 
from 65 to 66, for both men and women, was also brought forward (from 2024-2026) and is 
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due to take place between December 2018 and October 2020. The magnitude and far reaching 
extent of the 2011 reforms were non-trivial: estimates suggest 5 million individuals were 
affected (House of Commons library, 2017). The 2014 Pension Act brought forward planned 
increases to SPA of the 2011 Pension Act.10 
The legislated changes to SPA are summarised visually in Figure 1 for men and Figure 2 for 
women. It is important to note that the exact increase in SPA under the reform is not uniform 
between men and women or within gender and depends on an individual’s exact date of birth. 
Each figure shows the age at which an individual is eligible to claim their SP depending on the 
Pension Act in place at the time of their survey interview. Specific details of the changes made 
to SPA in each Act are detailed in Appendix B. The Figures show there have been strong 
increases in SPA for individuals in the affected cohorts over a relatively short period of time: 
the largest increase for men is one year and for women it is two years.   
The changes made to SPA for women has been criticized by the so-called Women Against 
State Pension Inequality (WASPI) group which argues that females in the most affected cohorts 
received insufficient advance notification of the changes they faced (House of Commons 
library, 2017). In terms of actual labour supply effects, Cribb et al. (2016) analyse the increase 
in female SPA from 60 to 62 and found the reform increased the employment rate of affected 
individuals by 6.3 percentage points. At the time of writing, the reforms to men’s SPA had only 
just begun to take effect and no data is available to analyse the effect of the reform. Indeed, the 
fact that many of the changes to SPA will not take place for some time and have only been 
                                                            
10 The 2014 Pension Act also legislated that the SPA would be reviewed on a periodic basis. The March 2017 
recommendation of the Cridland Review of bringing forward the increase of SPA from 67 to 68 does not affect 
our sample respondents.  
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implemented gradually underlines the importance of understanding whether individuals intend 
to adjust their ERA.  
 
Figure 1: UK State Pension Acts and Men’s SPA  
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Figure 2: UK State Pension Acts and Women’s SPA  
 
2.2 Abolishment of the mandatory retirement age 
Until October 2011, existing legislation meant that employees had relatively few employment 
rights after the age of 65; for example, employees were required to request permission to work 
past this age and therefore 65 became the ‘default retirement age’ (Lain et al., 2017). In 2011 
the implementation of the Employment Equality Regulations (EER) reform scrapped the so-
called default retirement age and allowed employers to retire employees only if there is a 
justifiable legal basis for doing so.  
The abolishment of mandatory retirement did not correspond with a sudden increase in 
employment rates among older workers, however there has been a general increasing trend in 
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SPA and reducing work hours or exiting the labour market in the UK (Kohli, 1991; Blundell, 
Bozio and Laroque, 2013). Moreover, the EER affected labour supply at the age 65, which 
would affect relatively more men than women in our sample given the historic differences in 
SPA conditional on gender. This contrasts with evidence from the US, which found a positive 
effect on participation rates following the introduction of a similar policy (von Wachter, 2009).  
3. Data  
The main analysis uses data from waves 2-6 (2010-2015) of the United Kingdom Household 
Panel Study (Understanding Society) the largest annual longitudinal household survey in the 
UK, providing information on around 40,000 households (Knies, 2017).11 Understanding 
Society contains detailed information relating to a range of individual and household economic 
and sociodemographic characteristics. We use the secure version of the study which contains 
individual’s day, month and year of birth which is, as discussed above, required to construct 
the exact age at which an individual is eligible to claim their State Pension.  
We follow previous research (Banks & Smith, 2006; Blundell, Bozio & Laroque, 2013) and 
assume that individuals perceive the term ‘retirement’ to correspond to a significant reduction 
in labour supply; this could be a reduction at the intensive margin (hours worked) or at the 
extensive margin (cessation of employment).  
Understanding Society fields a ‘retirement planning’ module at each wave which contains a 
range of questions asking individual’s for their subjective expectation of particular events 
associated with retirement. The specific question utilised in our analysis is worded as follows:  
                                                            
11 An additional robustness check uses waves 2,3,7 and 8 (2010-2017).  
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  “There is a lot of policy interest in how people are planning for their long term future and 
retirement. At what age do you expect you will retire or will consider yourself to be retired?”  
Respondents provide an integer value or ‘don’t know’. The retirement planning module is age-
triggered therefore only individuals aged 45, 50, 55, 60 and 65 who consider themselves not 
retired are eligible to answer. We exclude 65-year-old men and 60-year-old women from our 
sample due to selection; it is likely that these individuals are systematically different (in an 
unobservable way) from the rest of our sample as they are working at or past SPA at the time 
the survey was administered.12 Appendix C describes the key economic and sociodemographic 
characteristics used in the analysis. Appendix D provides summary statistics on these same 
characteristics by gender.  
We restrict our sample to all individuals at each wave of the survey who are eligible to answer 
the survey and retirement planning question. We drop 228 men and 386 women whose response 
on the retirement planning question is ‘don’t know’ (5.86% and 7.54%, respectively).13 We 
then combine wave specific observations such that we have one observation per individual.14 
This gives an initial sample of 6,094 men and 7,485 women. Given the historic differences 
between employees and the self-employed in terms of pension provision and the types of 
                                                            
12 An alternative way of eliciting expectations is using subjective probabilities (Manski 2004) which has not been 
done in Understanding Society. 
13 These have relatively lower levels of education, are more likely to be public-sector workers and to be single, 
and also reported on average a lower level of income. We do not attempt to include these individuals in the 
estimation sample using a Heckman type framework due to the relatively low number of individuals in this group 
and unavailability of appropriate exclusion restrictions. 
14 Whilst Understanding Society is an annual survey, in a small number of cases the survey interview took place 
just after an individual’s, say, 45th birthday and just before their 46th birthday. We only kept one observation (the 
first) for each individual.   
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retirement saving vehicles utilised, in addition to issues such as selection and unobserved 
heterogeneity we restrict our analysis to only employees (3,897 men and 4,990 women). 
Finally, we restrict our estimation sample to include only those individuals for whom we know 
are a member of their workplace pension scheme. Our final sample consists of 2573 males and 
1834 females for which we have a complete information set. 
Only for Tables 1 and 2, we split our sample period into three subperiods defined by the State 
Pension Act in operation at the time of the individual’s survey interview. For men and women 
separately, we then split our sample into (roughly) single year age bands based on SPA and 
compute ERA for each SPA (band)-period combination.   
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Table 1 Mean ERA by period and SPA for male respondents.  
Cells: mean ERA Period       
SPA (age bands) January 1, 2010 - November 2, 2011 
November 3, 2011 
- May13, 2014 
May14, 2014 - 
December 31, 2015 All 
[65,65.5) 64.0  65.2  65.6 64.6 
[65.5,66.5) 64.0  64.5 64.9 64.4 
[66.5, 67)  No obs.  65.0 64.4 64.5 
All 64.1  64.6 64.6 64.5 
Notes: ERA= Expected Retirement Age; SPA = State Pension Age 
 
Table 2 Mean ERA by period and SPA for female respondents.  
Cells: mean ERA Period       
SPA (age bands) January 1, 2010 - November 2, 2011 
November 3, 2011 
- May13, 2014 
May14, 2014 - 
December 31, 2015 All 
[60, 60.5) 64.0  No obs. No obs. 64.0  
[60.5,61.5) 63.5 64.0 No obs. 63.7 
[61.5,62.5) 62.3 63.9 No obs. 63.8 
[62.5, 63.5) No obs. 63.7 No obs. 63.7 
[63.5,64.5) 62.9 63.9 64.6 63.5 
[64.5, 65.5) 63.4 64.8 65.1  63.6 
[65.5, 66.5) 62.9  (63.9 64.1  63.6 
[66.5, 67) No obs. 63.9 64.1  64.1 
All 63.1 63.9 64.1 63.7 
Notes: ERA= Expected Retirement Age; SPA = State Pension Age 
These tables show that younger cohorts of men and women (those with the highest SPA) do 
not sufficiently revise their ERA given the legislated increase in SPA. Over time males whose 
SPA band is between 65 and 66.5 report on average higher ERA compared to men whose SPA 
is over 66.5. For women, we find that those who have a SPA between 60 and 62.5 and surveyed 
earlier in the sample period report on average higher ERA. Table 2 also shows ERA increasing 
between the first and second period for women. 
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4. Methodology 
Figures 1 and 2 show that the change to SPA is gradual and relatively small for some cohorts; 
whilst for others it is much larger (up to two years). Moreover, the magnitude of the changes 
differs by DOB in different calendar years. This complex relationship between SPA on the one 
hand and calendar time and cohort on the other, makes it difficult to use standard econometric 
frameworks such as Difference-in-Difference, regression discontinuity designs (RDD) or 
regression kink designs (RKD) for analysing the relationship between the SPA and the ERA 
(Card et al., 2015; Card et al. 2017).15 Nevertheless, these studies show that if one controls for 
flexible (smooth) functions of the assignment variables, then one can identify the effect of SPA 
on ERA by exploiting the discontinuities as shown in Figures 1 and 2. We therefore take a 
parametric approach in which we control for polynomials in the assignment variables, which 
in our case are date of birth and survey interview.  
Our dependent variable is ERA and the assignment variables determining SPA are date of birth 
and time of the interview and are denoted by, respectively, d and t. We estimate the following 
equation by Least Squares for each gender: 
(1) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝜔𝜔0 + 𝜔𝜔1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔2?̃?𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔3?̃?𝑑𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜔𝜔2?̃?𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔3?̃?𝑡𝑖𝑖2 + µ𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜹𝜹𝑯𝑯𝑖𝑖 + ƺ𝑖𝑖 
The individual is indexed by i, ?̃?𝑑𝑖𝑖 is birth date in deviation of the sample minimum, ?̃?𝑡𝑖𝑖 is 
calendar time in deviation of the sample minimum and ƺ𝑖𝑖 is an error term. 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖 refers to individual 
characteristics and 𝑯𝑯𝑖𝑖 refers to household characteristics including that of the spouse. We 
include a rich set of controls that have been shown to be important in influencing ERA. For 
instance, being enrolled in an occupational pension scheme, individual’s income, health and 
                                                            
15 One possibility is to analyse the SPA-ERA relationship around the kink and jump points separately, however 
the low number of observations around these points, as there are many, makes this impossible. 
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spouse’s income (e.g., Chan & Stevens, 2004; Cobb-Clark & Stillman, 2006; Ho & Raymo, 
2009).16 It is possible that such factors have changed over time and could potentially influence 
SPA results if not controlled for, as SPA is cohort specific. In addition to following previous 
studies regarding the relative importance of controlling for particular characteristics, we 
believe they are of interest in their own right given the policy relevance of this paper. 
The key coefficient of interest is 𝜔𝜔1 associated with 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖. If  𝜔𝜔1 is positive (negative) this 
indicates ERA rises (falls) for a given increase in SPA and if equal to one it would mean that 
individuals adjust their ERA with exact the same number of years as the rise in their SPA. If 
𝜔𝜔1 is equal to zero, that is no effect of SPA on individual’s ERA, this would be consistent with 
individuals having perfect foresight or, in the other extreme, individuals being ‘naïve’ with 
respect to announced changes to SPA. Finally, to investigate if the effect of SPA on ERA differs 
by socioeconomic status, we estimate models with interactions between SPA and X or H. 
5. Estimation results 
Our main specification controls for a rich set of individual and household characteristics, 
results suggest a subset of these are especially important in determining ERA and therefore we 
focus our discussion on these factors. We estimate two versions of Eq. (1); the first does not 
include interactions between these factors and SPA whereas the latter does, thus allowing us to 
determine whether particular subgroups of individuals adjust their ERA more rapidly in 
response to changes in SPA.  
                                                            
16 In preliminary specifications, we controlled for an extensive set of spousal characteristics however only few 
were found to be statistically significant. 
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 5.1 Men  
Table 3, first column, indicates that an increase in SPA has no significant effect on men’s ERA 
conditional on controlling for all other factors. Concerning individual economic and 
sociodemographic characteristics, men who do not report being a member of their workplace 
pension scheme report, on average, an ERA which is 0.83 years higher compared to those who 
are a member. This may suggest that occupational pensions are not only important in 
determining the level of income in retirement but also the age at which individuals expect to 
retire. Relative to individuals who hold a degree, having a lower level of educational attainment 
has a negative effect on ERA. The size and significance of this effect varies depending on level 
of attainment: having an A-level (13 years of fulltime education) compared to a degree (16 
years of fulltime education) lowers the ERA by around 0.73 years and is even larger for 
individuals with ‘other’ (relatively basic) types of qualification.  
Individuals’ job occupations significantly affect their ERA; belonging to lower grade 
occupational groups has a negative effect on ERA. In terms of the magnitude of this effect the 
predicted effect on ERA for a male in an unskilled occupation is -1.1 years relative to a 
professional.  In addition to occupation, sector of work is also of significant importance. The 
marginal effect of working in the public sector lowered men’s ERA by on average 1.2 years. 
The results suggest that higher levels of monthly household and individual income lower ERA. 
For example, holding all other factors constant at their average values, a one standard deviation 
increase in individual (household) income leads to ERA decreasing by 0.73 (0.25) years 
compared to the mean.  Housing tenure was also found to be important, relative to individuals 
who owned their home outright; owning with a mortgage or renting had a positive impact on 
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ERA.17 Whilst we control for a range of spousal level characteristics (not reported) we do not 
find any factors which are statistically significant. 
 
  
                                                            
17 In preliminary specifications we control for a range of spousal characteristics however none were statistically 
significant.  
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Table 3 Determinants of the Expected Retirement Age for men and women 
  Men Women 
State Pension Age (SPA) 0.143 0.291† 
 (0.282) (0.168) 
Educational attainment (reference is university degree)     
Other higher degree -0.587* -0.609* 
 (0.267) (0.303) 
A-level etc -0.725** -0.327 
 (0.247) (0.321) 
GCSE etc -0.464 -0.372 
 (0.278) (0.336) 
Other qualification -0.902** -0.201 
 (0.317) (0.431) 
No qualification -0.658 -0.782 
  (0.465) (0.677) 
Occupation (references is professional)   
Managerial & technical occupation -0.817** -0.286 
 (0.295) (0.439) 
Skilled non-manual -1.736*** 0.291 
 (0.366) (0.496) 
Skilled manual -0.942** 0.933 
 (0.339) (0.720) 
Partly skilled occupation -0.885* 0.22 
 (0.397) (0.527) 
Unskilled occupation -1.103* 0.371 
 (0.496) (1.066) 
Public sector (relative to private sector) -1.216*** -0.456* 
 (0.179) (0.227) 
No occupational pension (relatively to having one) 0.830*** 0.687* 
  (0.216) (0.323) 
Housing tenure (reference is owned outright)   
Owned with mortgage 0.584** 0.979*** 
 (0.203) (0.242) 
Rent (or other) 1.600*** 2.555*** 
 (0.286) (0.381) 
Equivalized real monthly household income -0.517* -0.994*** 
 (0.228) (0.253) 
Real individual monthly income -1.558*** -0.326 
  (0.263) (0.248) 
Number of observations 2573 1834 
Adjusted R-squared 0.096 0.088 
Notes: †p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 and ***p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Other controls are 
quadratic cohort and time polynomials, self-reported health, long term health condition, region, ethnic minority 
group and number of dependent children. For women we also control for spouses’ health, education and 
occupation. Sample based on waves 2-6 of Understanding Society secure access version (study number SN 
6676), see University of Essex (2018). 
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6.2 Women 
Table 3, second column, shows that females make a partial adjustment with respect to the age 
at which they expect to retire for a given change in SPA. ERA increases on average by 0.29 
years for a one-year increase in SPA, though we note that our finding is only weakly 
significant at the 10% level.  
Occupational pension membership also plays an important role in determining ERA for 
females, not being a member of such a scheme raises ERA by 0.69 years. The magnitude of 
the effect is not dissimilar to that found for men and we also find that women who work in 
the public sector report a significantly lower ERA of just under half a year compared to 
private sector female employees.  
Whilst we find the same general pattern as men in terms of education namely, those who are 
lower educated report on average lower ERA, the result is only significant for individuals 
who held other types of higher degree (teaching qualifications, nursing qualification). The 
magnitude of the effect reduced ERA by around 0.6 years compared to those with a 
traditional university degree. We do not find significant effects for occupation skill levels.  
Turning to household level factors, we also find housing tenure is important in influencing 
ERA. Compared to women who own their home outright those who have a mortgage or (in 
particular) rent report on average a higher ERA (0.98 and 2.56 years respectively). We note 
the importance of household income; those females residing in households who report higher 
levels of income report on average a significantly lower ERA.  
Evidence suggests couples coordinate their retirement behaviour (Ho and Raymo, 2009; 
Merkurieva, 2017). Results not reported in Table 3 show that spousal characteristics such as 
economic status, health and occupation also affect ERA for women. Females who have a 
22 
 
spouse that is unemployed at the time of the survey interview report an ERA on average 2.85 
years higher than that of a female whose partner is employed. Our results suggest females who 
have a spouse in poorer health report a higher ERA ceteris paribus, whereas those who have 
spouse’s in lower skilled occupations report a lower ERA. However, we find these results are 
statistically significant for only particular levels of health and occupation.  
5.3 Interaction effects and robustness check 
One concern for policymakers is whether potential at-risk groups have adjusted their ERA in 
response to changes to SPA. We explore whether there are any significant differences between 
particular sub-groups of men and women in light of the results in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. To do 
this we interact SPA with factors which were shown to be significant in the specification 
reported in Table 3.18 As the interactions effects are mostly, but not all, (jointly) insignificant, 
we discuss the main findings and refer interested readers to Appendix E. 
One potential at-risk group is the lower educated or unskilled who on average save less for 
retirement (Banks & Oldfield, 2007; Copolla & Wilke, 2014). While Table 3 shows that 
education is important for determining men’s ERA, we found no significant differences in 
revision to ERA (for a given change in SPA) by levels of education or skill. We did find a 
significant difference between public and private sector workers: male public sector employees 
who contribute to an occupational pension made a smaller adjustment to their ERA compared 
to their private sector counterparts. Furthermore, we found that men residing in households 
who report higher levels of income are significantly less likely to adjust their ERA in response 
to increases in SPA, conditional on all other factors.  
                                                            
18 Based on a F-test of joint significance.  
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It could be that individuals who are less sensitive to a given change in SPA can afford to and 
poorer individuals adjust their ERA simply because they must work for longer as they do not 
have the means to financially bridge the gap. Banks and Smith (2006) found richer British male 
employees (who are more likely to have an occupational pension which can be claimed at age 
55) tend to exhibit higher rates of early retirement. For women, and not for men, we find a 
strong negative effect when household income level is interacted with SPA on ERA holding 
all else constant; women living in households with higher income levels are on average less 
likely to adjust their ERA for a given increase in SPA. We find similar (albeit mild) evidence 
when we interact occupation and SPA: women who are in a managerial or technical occupation 
are less likely to adjust their ERA relative to those in a professional occupation. However, we 
find no evidence that the partly skilled or unskilled behave in a significantly different way 
relative to professionals.  Finally, our results also suggest there is an interaction effect between 
housing tenure and SPA: women living in rented accommodation are more likely to adjust their 
ERA for a given increase in SPA, relative to women who own their home outright conditional 
on all other factors.   
The results suggest that whilst there are some differences in the speed at which certain 
subgroups adjust conditional on gender; on balance most interactions are either insignificant or 
only mildly so. The one exception being household income. These findings are of policy 
relevance. If, for example as we find that lower educated and/or skilled men women do not 
adjust their ERA in response to legislated changes to SPA, and this group has a lower ability 
to save for old age this would imply significantly lower retirement savings compared to the 
highly educated and/or skilled. This will have a significant impact on their future living 
standards and impact pensioner poverty levels in years to come. 
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Evidence suggests there is a significant heterogeneity in pension and retirement wealth 
(including housing wealth) in the UK by education level and cohort (Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2010). This is likely to be related to differences during working life in availability of 
a workplace pension and type. For example, public sector employees in the UK were 
historically enrolled into a defined benefit workplace pension, whereas private sector 
employees were more likely to join a defined contribution scheme (ONS, 2018b). The former 
type of scheme is often described as relatively more generous (their availability has been 
significantly reduced) and this may explain why public sector employees made a smaller 
adjustment to their ERA. Similarly, we restate the importance of occupational pensions in 
determining not only living standards in retirement but influencing how much individuals 
intend to adjust their future labour supply in response to changes in SPA.  
Robustness check  
Despite controlling for a rich set of characteristics at both individual and household level, one 
may be concerned that unobservable individual level factors could affect our findings. To 
address this, we exploit the panel aspect of Understanding Society, noting that conditional on 
not attriting the same individual completes the retirement planning module once every five 
years. Therefore, it is possible to construct a balanced panel for those individuals who were 
eligible to complete the retirement planning module at wave 2 or 3 and again at wave 7 or 8. 
We restrict the analysis to those men (women) aged below 60 (55) in their initial wave of 
observation and cluster standard errors.   
We estimate a fixed effect regression model to account for individual level time invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity for a simple specification, which controls for our main covariates of 
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interest: SPA, occupational pension membership and income.19 We find, for both men and 
women, no statistically significant evidence that changes in SPA affect ERA. For men this is 
consistent with our finding in Table 3, however for women it may suggest that the partial 
adjustment effect reported in Table 3 is not robust and that also women’s ERA is not responsive 
to changes in SPA. We refer interested readers to Appendix F.  
6. Discussion and concluding remarks  
Given the fiscal implications of population ageing, influencing how individuals prepare for 
retirement and old age has become a key issue for governments in advanced OECD countries 
including the UK. One policy lever is to extend working lives by increasing SPA. In the UK 
successive State Pension Acts have increased the SPA or brought forward already legislated 
increases to reduce the cost of state pensions for the exchequer (Barrell, 2011). 
In this paper we have considered whether individuals adjust their ERA in response to changes 
in SPA, and if the direction of adjustment is consistent with the policy objective. Our main 
results suggest that individuals have not adjusted their ERA in response to increases in SPA 
up to one year for men and two years for women. If policymakers wish to use SPA as a tool 
to alter ERA and extend working lives among future cohorts then our findings suggest 
additional initiatives are required. In particular, if the root-cause of this non-adjustment is 
related to insufficient information given the number of reforms introduced in a relatively 
                                                            
19 Results are available on request. An extended specification was also estimated which included a wide set of 
characteristics however they did not change the qualitative nature of the results described above. We also 
estimated random effect specifications and tested for which specification preferred using a generalised Hausman 
test. Whilst for (men) women the null hypothesis was (not) rejected; implying a fixed specifications for females 
only, we report results based on this specification for both groups for comparability. Note that in this case it was 
not possible to control for cohort effects, as these are time invariant.  
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short period of time, it would highlight the need for effective communication on the 
consequences of the increased SPA for individuals’ long-term financial plans. Of course, it is 
possible individuals adjust their actual behaviour once they are ‘close’ to SPA; though we 
note that existing evidence suggests only 1 in 10 women affected by recent reforms have 
done so (Disney and Tanner, 1999; Cribb et al., 2016) and future research can address if this 
also holds for the SPA reforms considered in this paper. 
Alongside SPA we also consider whether individual and household characteristics influence 
ERA. Occupational pensions play a major role in determining living standards for a large 
section of the older population in the UK. We find not being an active member of an 
occupational pension plan increases ERA; moreover when interacted with SPA these same 
individuals are also more likely to adjust their ERA upwards than those who are contributing 
to such a scheme. This effect could be related to the fact that, unlike in countries such as the 
Netherlands and Germany, occupational pensions in the UK can be claimed at age 55, over 
10 years prior to being eligible to claim state pension.   
Household income also affects ERA directly and when interacted with SPA, individuals 
living in higher income households report a lower ERA and are slower to adjust ERA for 
given changes in SPA consistent with past evidence of actual retirement behaviour in the UK 
(Banks and Smith, 2006). Sector of work (and job occupation) was also important for women 
(men), due to data limitations it was not possible to determine whether working in a particular 
industry affected ERA, something which should be addressed in future work.  
In terms of adjusting ERA to the recent SPA reforms, our results suggest three groups are at 
risk: those working in the public sector, the low educated and/or skilled and younger 
individuals. This is of serious concern given that some of these characteristics have been 
shown to be strongly associated with pensioner poverty in the UK (Kanabar, 2016). Public 
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sector workers have traditionally been eligible for (relatively generous) defined benefit 
pension schemes, though these are now increasingly rare, especially for new entrants. 
Younger individuals have been auto enrolled into workplace pensions but whilst coverage 
levels are high, at the time of writing little is known about how participation rates will adjust 
once planned increases in individual contributions are introduced. We also note that this 
reform will not adequately address pension saving shortfalls (adequacy) for lifetime low 
earners and older workers who shortly plan to exit the labour market.   
Given the importance of retirement planning for both individual’s own future wellbeing and 
central government expenditures, one route policymakers could take is to improve the 
effectiveness of marketing and information campaigns related to changes to SPA and 
planning for later more generally. A recent initiative being considered by the DWP is a so-
called ‘Pensions Dashboard’ which will provide individuals with their personal (forecasted) 
financial position in retirement (DWP, 2019). Policies such as auto enrolment have also been 
introduced to boost pension savings, however, are primarily aimed at low wage workers and 
have initially been concerned with pension coverage rather than contribution level.  
 
 
 
 
  
28 
 
References 
Age UK. (2018). https://www.ageuk.org.uk/latest-news/articles/2018/january/poorest-
pensioners-dependent-on-state-pension/ 
Banks, J., Emmerson, C., & Tetlow, G. (2018). Long-run Trends in the Economic Activity of 
Older People in the UK (No. w24606). National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Banks, J., & Oldfield, Z. (2007). Understanding pensions: Cognitive function, numerical 
ability and retirement saving. Fiscal studies, 28(2), 143-170 
Banks, J., & Smith, S. (2006). Retirement in the UK. Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, 22(1), 40-56. 
Barrell, R., Kirby, S., & Orazgani, A. (2011). The macroeconomic impact from extending 
working lives.  
Benitez-Silva, H., & Dwyer, D. S. (2005). The rationality of retirement expectations and the 
role of new information. Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(3), 587-592. 
Bernheim, B.D. (1989) The timing of retirement: A comparison of expectations and 
realizations, in D.A. Wise (ed) The Economics of Aging, Chicago University Press for 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Blundell, R., Bozio, A., & Laroque, G. (2013). Extensive and intensive margins of labour 
supply: Work and working hours in the US, the UK and France. Fiscal Studies, 34(1), 1-29. 
Blundell, R., Meghir, C., & Smith, S. (2002). Pension incentives and the pattern of early 
retirement. The Economic Journal, 112(478), C153-C170. 
29 
 
Bottazzi, R., Jappelli, T., & Padula, M. (2006). Retirement expectations, pension reforms, 
and their impact on private wealth accumulation. Journal of Public Economics, 90(12), 2187-
2212. 
Buck, N., & McFall, S. (2011). Understanding Society: design overview. Longitudinal and 
Life Course Studies, 3(1), 5-17. 
Card, D., Lee, D. S., Pei, Z., & Weber, A. (2015). Inference on causal effects in a generalized 
regression kink design. Econometrica, 8 
Card, D., Lee, D. S., Pei, Z., & Weber, A. (2017). Regression kink design: Theory and 
practice. In Regression Discontinuity Designs: Theory and Applications (pp. 341-382). 
Emerald Publishing Limited. 
Chan, S., & Stevens, A. H. (2004). Do changes in pension incentives affect retirement? A 
longitudinal study of subjective retirement expectations. Journal of Public Economics, 88(7-
8), 1307-1333.  
Coile, C. (2004). Retirement incentives and couples' retirement decisions. Topics in 
Economic Analysis & Policy, 4(1). 
Coppola, M., & Wilke, C. B. (2014). At what age do you expect to retire? Retirement 
expectations and increases in the statutory retirement age. Fiscal Studies, 35(2), 165-188. 
Cribb, J., & Emmerson, C. (2016). What happens when employers are obliged to nudge? 
Automatic enrolment and pension saving in the UK. Institute for Fiscal Studies. At: 
https://www. ifs. org. uk/publications/8723. 
Cribb, J., Emmerson, C., & Tetlow, G. (2016). Signals matter? Large retirement responses to 
limited financial incentives. Labour Economics, 42, 203-212. 
30 
 
Cribb, J, Hood, A. & Joyce, R.. (2016). The Economic Circumstances of Different 
Generations: The Latest Picture. Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
De Grip, A., Fouarge, D., & Montizaan, R. (2013). How sensitive are individual retirement 
expectations to raising the retirement age?. De Economist, 161(3), 225-251. 
Denton, F., & Spencer, B. (2009). What Is Retirement? A Review and Assessment of 
Alternative Concepts and Measures. Canadian Journal on Aging / La Revue Canadienne Du 
Vieillissement, 28(1), 63-76. doi:10.1017/S0714980809090047 
Disney, R., & Tanner, S. (1999). What can we learn from retirement expectations data? (No. 
W99/17). IFS Working Papers. 
DWP. (2010). What does the distribution of wealth tell us about future retirement resources?. 
Research report no. 665. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/214436/rrep665.pdf 
DWP (2015). The Pensioners’ Income Series 2013/14. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/pensioners-incomes-series-financial-year-201314 
DWP (2017a). Press release: New timetable for state pension changes to maintain fair and 
sustainable pension. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-timetable-for-state-pension-
changes-to-maintain-fair-and-sustainable-pension 
DWP (2017b). Automatic Enrolment Review 2017: Maintaining the Momentum. Department 
for Work and Pensions. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/668971/automatic-enrolment-review-2017-maintaining-the-momentum.PDF 
31 
 
DWP. (2018). Pensioners’ Incomes Series: An analysis of trends in Pensioner Incomes: 
1994/95-2016/17. Department for Work and Pensions.  
DWP. (2019). Pensions dashboards: feasibility report and consultation. Consultation 
outcome. https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/pensions-dashboards-feasibility-
report-and-consultation 
 
Fenge, R., & Pestieau, P. (2005). Social security and early retirement. MIT Press Books, 1. 
Gustman, A. L., Steinmeier, T. L., & Tabatabai, N. (2012). Financial knowledge and 
financial literacy at the household level. American Economic Review, 102(3), 309-13. 
Ho, J. H., & Raymo, J. M. (2009). Expectations and realization of joint retirement among 
dual-worker couples. Research on Aging, 31(2), 153-179. 
Independent (2017). Proportion of single pensioners relying solely on State hits highest level 
in over 20 years.  https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/single-pensioners-
relying-solely-state-pension-highest-level-1995-1996-a7686976.html  
Kanabar, R. (2015). Post-retirement labour supply in England. The Journal of the Economics 
of Ageing, 6, 123-132. 
Knies, G. (2017). Understanding Society: Waves 1-7, 2009-2016 and harmonised British 
Household Panel Survey: Waves 1-18, 1991-2009, User Guide. Colchester: University of 
Essex. 
Lain, D. (2017). Employment of workers aged 65 and over: The importance of policy 
context. In The Palgrave Handbook of Age Diversity and Work (pp. 475-497). Palgrave 
Macmillan, London. 
32 
 
Lundberg, S. (1999). Family bargaining and retirement behavior. Behavioral dimensions of 
retirement economics, 253-272. 
Lassila, J. and Valkonen, T. (2018), Longevity, Working Lives and Public Finances. 
Contemp Econ Policy, 36: 467-482. doi:10.1111/coep.12262 
Lusardi, A., & Mitchelli, O. S. (2007). Financial literacy and retirement preparedness: 
Evidence and implications for financial education. Business economics, 42(1), 35-44. 
Manski, C. F. (2004), Measuring Expectations. Econometrica, 72: 1329-1376. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00537.x 
Mastrogiacomo, Mauro. (2004). On expectations, realizations and mandatory 
retirement. Pension systems: beyond mandatory retirement, 1-31. 
Michaud, Pierre-Carl, and Frederic Vermeulen (2011). A Collective Labor Supply Model 
with Complementarities in Leisure: Identification and Estimation by Means of Panel Data, 
Labour Economics 18 (2): 159-67. 
OBR (2018).Welfare spending: state pension. http://obr.uk/forecasts-in-depth/tax-by-tax-
spend-by-spend/welfare-spending-state-pension/ 
ONS (2018a). Trends in self employment in the UK. 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemploye
etypes/articles/trendsinselfemploymentintheuk/2018-02-07 
ONS (2018b). Occupational Pensions Scheme Survey, UK: 2017. Statistical bulletin. 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/pens
ionssavingsandinvestments/bulletins/occupationalpensionschemessurvey/uk2017 
33 
 
ONS (2018c). Employment rate 65+ People. 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemploye
etypes/timeseries/lfk6/lms (retrieved on April 8, 2019). 
OECD (2015). Pensions at a Glance. https://doi.org/10.1787/19991363. 
OECD (2017). Pensions at a Glance. https://doi.org/10.1787/19991363 
ONS (2015). How has life expectancy changed over time? 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/lifeexpect
ancies/articles/howhaslifeexpectancychangedovertime/2015-09-09 
Platts, L. G., Corna, L. M., Worts, D., Mcdonough, P., Price, D., & Glaser, K. (2017). 
Returns to work after retirement: a prospective study of unretirement in the United 
Kingdom. Ageing & Society, 1-26. 
Thurley, D. (2017). Pension flexibilities: the ‘freedom and choice’ reforms. Briefing paper 
number CBP-06891. House of Commons library. 
University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research. 2018. Understanding 
Society: Waves 1-7, 2009-2016 and Harmonised BHPS: Waves 1-18, 1991-2009. [data 
collection]. 8th edition. UK Data Service. SN: 6676, 
https://beta.ukdataservice.ac.uk/datacatalogue/studies/study?id=6676  
Van Santen, P., Alessie, R., & Kalwij, A. (2012). Probabilistic survey questions and incorrect 
answers: Retirement income replacement rates. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 82(1), 267-280. 
 
34 
 
APPENDIX A  
Occupational and personal pensions in the UK (Second and Third Pillars) 
Occupational pensions.  
Occupational pensions are a voluntary form of retirement saving and make up the second 
pillar of the UK pension system. These have traditionally been Defined Contribution (DC) or 
Direct Benefit (DB) type pension schemes; individuals are taxed on receipt of income from 
their occupational pension not at point of contribution. Occupational pensions (and personal 
pensions) play an important role in providing income in retirement, given that the level of 
state pension is relatively low in the UK (OECD, 2017). For example, average net 
replacement rates increase from 29 percent (state pension alone) to 62.2 percent after 
accounting for the presence of an occupational pension (OECD, 2017). From April 2002 
individuals have been able to claim their state pension from the age of 55 (up from 50); 
highlighting the significant gap between claiming occupational and state pension in the UK 
for both men and women. A recent DWP report highlights that only 62 percent of pensioners 
expect to receive income from an occupational pension (DWP, 2015).  
In an effort to increase occupational pension coverage and hence retirement saving (but not 
retirement age per se), the UK government in April 2012 introduced Auto Enrolment (AE) a 
policy whereby employees were automatically enrolled into a workplace pension. Evidence 
has shown that such ‘nudge’ behaviour has been effective in terms of changing individuals 
behaviour in a particular way (in this case minimising opt out) given a particular policy 
objective (Cribb and Emmerson, 2016).20 Early evidence from the introduction of AE 
                                                            
20 Auto enrollment was gradually phased in starting with larger employers before moving on to smaller employers, 
note that it does not cover the self-employed and we do not include such individuals in our sample for analysis 
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suggests it has been largely successful in terms of coverage but issues such as increasing 
contribution rates conditional on participation still remain (Cribb et al. 2016; DWP 2017b).  
The UK government has also made significant changes to the way in which retirement 
savings made via a DC pension can be drawn and used. Until March 2015 individuals could 
draw down up to 25 percent (tax free) as a lump sum and annuitize the remainder; however, 
following the introduction of the Pensions Schemes Act 2015; individuals are free to use their 
retirement savings as desired. A priori it is not clear how this policy change may influence 
retirement expectations. One possibility is that given it came into effect soon after the 2014 
state pension act, which introduced further increases to SPA, the 2015 Pensions Schemes Act 
(PSA) could have mitigated upward revisions to ERA. For example, if individuals were likely 
to be liquidity constrained, the policy reform meant this would no longer be the case and 
ceteris paribus induce individuals to retire earlier.  
Thurley (2017) summarises the impact of the 2015 PSA on individuals and shows that the 
introduction of the reform led to significantly more individuals drawing down their pension 
pot early (before age 65), that the majority of these early withdrawers had relatively small 
pension pots (<£30,000) and the number of annuities being taken out falling sharply and 
drawdown becoming the norm. Importantly, evidence suggested most individuals did not 
consider their DC pension as their main source of retirement income (the majority reported 
DB and State Pension) and that it was common for individuals to access their pension pots 
whilst still employment (FCA, 2018). Evidence also suggested the reforms did not lead 
                                                            
purposes due to the way the UK pension system has historically treated self-employed versus employees, in 
addition to  issues such as selection and unobserved heterogeneity. 
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individuals ‘squandering’ their retirement savings and instead choosing to invest in 
alternative forms of saving (Thurley, 2017).  
Personal pensions.  
Personal pensions are another type of voluntary retirement saving, between an individual and 
a provider (usually an insurance firm); and make up the third tier of the UK state pension 
system. Personal pensions are usually a DC type scheme and are treated in the same way as 
occupational pensions from a taxation perspective.21 Individuals must be aged at least 55 
before they are eligible to claim their personal pension; the ‘Pension Freedom’ reforms 
introduced in 2015 affected personal pensions in the same way they did occupational 
pensions.  
The widespread availability and uptake of occupational pensions since the 1950s and the fact 
that the UK labour market has historically been made up of employees means the proportion 
of individuals who have a personal pensions is higher among the self-employed, a group of 
individuals who we do not consider in this study.22 This also means that when analysing 
retirement age expectations among employees it is relatively more important to control for 
the presence of an occupational pension rather than a personal pension.  
 
                                                            
21An individual can have an occupational and personal pension although certain limits exist in terms of total 
contributions made within a tax year. a tax year runs from 6th April each year to 5th April the following year. The 
annual pension contribution allowance on a personal pension is set by government; in the 2018-19 tax year it is 
£40,000. 
22 Self-employment rates have increased in the period after the Financial Crisis; nonetheless the self-employed 
still only make up 15% of the labour force in the UK (ONS, 2018a).  
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Appendix B: Summary of the UK State Pension Acts. 
Men 
Period 1: 2007 Pension Act.  
Law from beginning of sample period until November 2, 2011 
Main changes made to SPA:  
• If a man is born before 6th April 1959: SPA=65  
• If a man is born after 6th April 1959: SPA=65+1 month (1 month if born on 6th 
April, less if born after 6th April), born between 6th May and 5th June 1959: 
SPA=65+2 months (if born on 6th May less if born after). Born between 6th 
February and 6th March 1960: SPA=65+11 (11 months if born on 6th February 
1960, less if born after) 
• If a man is born after 6th March 1960 but before 6th April 1968: SPA=66 
Period 2: 2011 Pension Act. 
Law between November 3, 2011 and May 13, 2014 
Main changes made to SPA:  
• If a man is born before 6th December 1953: SPA=65 
• If a man is born after 6th December 1953 and before 5th January 1954: SPA=65+3 
months, born between 6th January and 5th February 1954: SPA=65+3+1, …., born 
between 6th September 1954 and 5th October 1954: SPA=65+3+8 (for the youngest 
i.e. born 5th October 1954, it will be 66 for those born on 6th September 1954). 
• If a man is born October 1954 – March 1968: SPA=66 
• If a man is born between 6th April-5th May 1968: SPA=66+1, …, between 6th 
February 1969 and 5th March 1969: SPA=66+11 (if born on 6th February 1969) 
• If a man is born from 6th March 1969 onwards: SPA=67 
• If a man is born after 5th April 1969 but before 6th April 1977 attains pensionable age 
when the person attains the age of 67. Born 6th April 1977 to 5th May 1977 then SPA 
is 67+1 month (if born on 6th April 1977) 
• If a man is born 6th May 1977 to 5th June 1977 then SPA is 67+2 month (if born on 
6th May 1977) until 6th March 1978 to 5th April 1978 after which SPA: 68 
• A man born after 5th April 1978 attains pensionable age when the person attains the 
age of 68.  
Period 3: 2014 Pension Act. 
Law between May 14, 2014 –and end of sample period  
• Cohorts up to and including 5th April 1960: as in period 2. 
• If a man is born on or after 6th April 1960-5th May 1960: SPA=66+1 month, …,6th 
February 1961-5th March 1961: SPA+66+11 
• If a man is born in March 1961 or later: SPA=67 
• The increase in SPA going from 67 to 68 is identical to that described in period 2.  
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Women 
Period 1:  2007 Pension Act 
Law from beginning of sample period until November 2, 2011 
• A woman born before 6th April 1950 attains pensionable age when she attains the age 
of 60. 
• -A women born between 6th April 1950 and 5th May 1950 reaches SPA when she is 
60+1 month (at most if she is born on 6th April 1950), If 6th May1950≤born<5th 
June 1950 then SPA: 60+2 months... and so on...until 6th March 1955≤born<5th 
April 1955: SPA is 64 years and 11 months.  
• A woman born after 5th April 1955 but before 6th April 1959 she attains pensionable 
age when she is 65 
• -A woman after 6th April 1959- same rules as detailed for men above. 
Period 2: 2011 Pension Act. 
Law between November 3, 2011 and May 13, 2014 
• -A woman who is born 6th April 1953 -5th May 1953: SPA is 63 years + 3 
months…… (note that under the 1995/2007 act her SPA would have been 63 years+1 
months), so an increase of two months.  
• -A woman born 6th May 1953-5th June 1953: SPA is 63 years + 6 months (note that 
under the 1995/2007 act her SPA would have been 63 years+2 months), so an 
increase of four months. 
• …and so… until: 
• A woman born 6th November 1953-5th December 1953: SPA is 65. 
• Then for those born after 6th December 1953 the spa for females is same as that for 
males above, note however that the increase in state pension age is larger for those 
individuals born between December 1953 and March 1955, compared to individuals 
born after 1955. 
Period 3: 2014 Pension Act. 
Law between May 14, 2014 –and end of sample period 
• Same rules as for men. 
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Appendix C variable definitions  
Variable Definition & Categories 
Dependent variable   
ERA Individuals expected age of retirement 
Individual level covariates 
 
SPA Age at which individual is eligible to claim their state pension according to 
State Pension Act in operation at time of respondent’s survey interview and his 
or her date of birth. 
 
Marital status 
 
Single, Married/living as a couple, Divorced or Widowed 
Self-reported health Excellent, Very good, Good, Fair, Poor 
Government office region 
of residence 
North East, North West, Yorkshire and Humberside, East Midlands, West 
Midlands, East of England, London, South East, South West, Wales, Scotland, 
Northern Ireland 
Highest educational 
qualification 
University degree, Other higher degree (for example nurse), A-level (13 years 
full time education), GCSE (11 years full time education), Other qualification, 
No qualification  
Long term health condition 0=No, 1=Yes; A long-standing physical or mental impairment, illness or 
disability. By 'long-standing' refers to anything that has troubled you over a 
period of at least 12 months or that is likely to trouble you over a period of at 
least 12 months. 
Ethnicity  White majority, Other white groups, other ethnic group (made up of: Indian, 
Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean or mixed W&BC, Black African or 
mixed W&BA, Chinese, Arab, other Asian, mixed W&As or other ethnic 
groups). 
Occupational classification Professional, Managerial and technical, Skilled non-manual, Skilled manual, 
Partly skilled, Unskilled  
Public sector worker Yes=1; No=0 
Log total net income  Individual. Total net income adjusted for inflation.   
Total net (of tax and NICS) income is the sum of: labour income, 
miscellaneous income, private benefit income, investment income, pension 
income and social benefit income.  
Member of an employer’s 
pension scheme 
Yes=0; No=1 
Household level covariates 
 
Housing tenure Housing tenure of household individual resides in at the time of survey 
interview: Owned outright, owned with mortgage, rent (or other) 
Household log income  Total post –tax equivalized household net income (of all household members) 
which has been adjusted for inflation (2015 prices) and household size using 
the OECD scale.  
Number of individuals not 
in paid employment in 
household 
0, 1, 2 or 3 
Number of dependent 
children in household 
0, 1, 2 or 3 
Spousal level 
characteristics  
Economic status (employed, unemployed or other), Self-reported health, 
Highest educational qualification, Occupational classification 
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Appendix D: Descriptive characteristics by gender.     
Variable Sample means Variable Sample means Variable Sample means 
  Men Women   Men Women   Men Women 
Age 51.02 50.30 South West 0.09 0.09 Public 0.37 0.65 
ERA 64.00 63.14 Wales 0.07 0.06 Number of dependent children 
SPA 65.92 65.73 Scotland 0.10 0.11 0 0.65 0.69 
DOB (linear) 11.35 11.94 Northern Ireland 0.06 0.06 1 0.16 0.18 
Time (linear) 2.82 2.74 Degree 0.32 0.33 2 0.14 0.11 
Income 
  
Other 
higher 
degree 
(nurse, 
teacher etc) 
0.13 0.18 3 0.04 0.03 
Equivalised net household income 0.04 0.27 
A level (13 
years f/t 
education) 
0.22 0.16 Housing tenure  
Individual total monthly net income 0.06 0.06 
GCSE (11 
years f/t 
education) 
0.19 0.22 Owned outright 0.24 0.26 
Occupational pension Other qualification 0.10 0.08 
Owned with 
a mortgage 0.63 0.65 
No 0.15 0.16 No qualification 0.04 0.04 
Rented or 
other 0.13 0.09 
Self-reported health Long term health condition  Spousal characteristics 
Excellent 0.18 0.20 Yes (=1, No=0) 0.28 0.29 Economic status  
very good  0.40 0.38 Ethnic group  Employed 0.99  
good   0.30 0.30 White majority 0.86 0.88 Other 0.01 
 
fair   0.11 0.10 Other white 0.04 0.04 Health status  
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Poor 0.02 0.01 
All other 
ethnic 
minorities 
0.09 0.08 Excellent 0.19 
 
Government office region  Social class of current occupation Very good 0.40  
North East 0.04 0.04 Professional 0.08 0.05 Good 0.28  
North West 0.10 0.10 Managerial 0.43 0.46 Fair 0.12  
Yorkshire and Humberside 0.07 0.07 Skilled non-manual 0.14 0.27 Poor 0.02 
 
East Midlands 0.08 0.09 Skilled manual 0.19 0.04 Social class of occupation** 
West Midlands 0.09 0.08 Partly skilled 0.11 0.14 Professional 0.08 
 
East of England 0.09 0.09 Unskilled 0.04 0.02 Managerial 0.44  
London 0.10 0.09 Sector of work 
 
Skilled non-
manual 0.10 
 
South East 0.12 0.13 Private 0.63 0.35 Skilled manual 0.28 
 
      Partly 
skilled 0.07 
 
            Unskilled  0.04   
Notes: Income measured as deviation from sample minimum. Sample based on waves 2-6 of Understanding Society 
secure access version (study number SN 6676), see University of Essex (2018).     
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Appendix E: Interaction results  
We estimate an extended specification (by gender) to determine the relative importance of 
particular covariates of interest based on the results in Table 3 and their interaction with SPA. 
We test the null hypothesis that the interaction is jointly equal to zero. Full results are 
available on request.  
Men 
Null hypothesis:  factor does not have a 
statistically significant effect on GAP* Test statistic (F) P-value Implication 
Interaction effects    
Occupational pension 1.07 F(1,2508) 0.37 Not rejected 
Individual income 1.04 F (1,2508) 0.31 Not rejected 
Household income 7.94 F (1,2508) 0.00 Rejected 
Education 1.36 F (5,2508) 0.24 Not rejected 
Occupation 1.07 F (5,2508) 0.37 Not rejected 
Public sector worker 0.90 F (1,2508) 0.34 Not rejected 
Housing tenure 0.77 F (2,2508) 0.46 Not rejected 
* Null hypothesis tests that the estimated coefficient is not statistically different from zero 
 
Women 
Null hypothesis:  factor does not have a 
statistically significant effect on GAP* Test statistic (F) P-value Implication 
Interaction effects    
Occupation 1.93 F(5,1751) 0.09 Mildy reject  
Public sector worker 0.18 F(1,1751) 0.67 Not rejected 
Ethnicity 1.34 F(8,1751) 0.22 Not rejected  
Housing tenure 2.8 F(2,1751) 0.06 Not rejected  
* Null hypothesis tests that the estimated coefficient is not statistically different from zero 
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Appendix F: specification controlling for individual fixed effects.  
  ERA , Men ERA, Women 
State pension age -0.191 -1.239 
 (0.545) (0.678) 
Time polynomial 0.214 0.398 
 (0.202) (0.221) 
Time polynomial squared -0.0258 -0.0266 
 (0.0247) (0.0308) 
Equivalised real monthly 
household income 0.0726 0.313 
 (0.528) (0.527) 
Real individual monthly 
income 0.483 0.0737 
 (0.606) (0.357) 
No occupational pension -0.118 -0.75 
 (0.519) (0.587) 
Constant  72.07* 141.4** 
 (35.94) (44.66) 
Standard deviation of 
residuals within individual 3.73 4.21 
Standard deviation of overall 
error term 2.53 2.9 
Proportion of variance due 
to differences across 
individuals 
0.68 6.78 
Correlation between 
individual fixed effect and 
covariates 
-0.19 -0.25 
Number of observations 900 968 
 Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 and ***p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Time 
polynomials are defined in terms of deviation from sample mean. Sample based on 
waves 2,3,7 and 8 of Understanding Society secure access data (study number 
Sn_6676_Und_Soc). See data source information above. Time polynomial is 
calculated as deviation from sample mean.   
  
 
